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Lessons from all previous financial crises tell us that government regulation 
failure and moral hazard of financial safety net are inevitable. So market discipline 
should play its important role in bank's risk prevention and control. As one of the 
"Three Pillars" of the New Basel Capital Accord framework on effective banking 
supervision, the role of market discipline has been confirmed by a large number of 
literatures, and its importance to bank regulation has no need to go into. Whereas, 
market discipline plays its role bases on perfecting the internal governance of 
commercial bank, i.e., the corporate governance effect of market discipline. Most of 
the existing research on the influence of market discipline on bank risk-taking have 
ignored the key role of bank's internal governance, few of them combine market 
discipline with bank's internal governance to systematically study the bank risk-taking. 
Therefore, it is of immediate significance to incorporate bank's internal governance 
into research on market discipline on bank risk-taking. 
Firstly, this article analyses mechanism of market discipline on bank risk-taking 
and the corporate governance effect of market discipline. Then around two key 
elements of commercial bank's internal governance, equity structure and executive 
compensation, we study impact of commercial bank's internal governance on bank 
risk-taking. On this basis, using research method of scholars at home and abroad for 
reference, we adopt the data of Chinese commercial banks to do empirical study on 
the relationship among market discipline, commercial bank's internal governance and 
bank risk-taking. The empirical results show that: The improvement of market 
discipline can help to reduce the risk that commercial banks take; the effect of market 
discipline on commercial bank risk-taking is influenced by its internal governance, 
different internal governance lead to different effect of market discipline. Finally, we 
deeply analyses problems existing in internal governance of commercial bank in the 
financial crisis broke out in 2008, and make comparisons among different internal 
governance mode around the world and their performance in this financial crisis. 















commercial bank in China, we put forward the enlightenment for improving internal 
governance of commercial bank in our country. 
The academic value of this article are mainly on: (1) Systematically analyses 
mechanism of market discipline on bank risk-taking and the corporate governance 
effect of market discipline; (2) Around two key elements of commercial bank's 
internal governance, equity structure and executive compensation, we study impact of 
commercial bank's internal governance on bank risk-taking; (3) Using 
research method of scholars at home and abroad for reference, we adopt the data of 
Chinese commercial banks to do empirical study on the relationship among market 
discipline, commercial bank's internal governance and bank risk-taking; (4) Deeply 
analyses problems existing in internal governance of commercial bank in the financial 
crisis broke out in 2008, using it as a base, we put forward the enlightenment for 
improving internal governance of commercial bank in China. 
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